护栏

放行

风险类别:无 · 照做会有多大伤害:完全没有

在提示词抵达你的模型之前先筛一道。

Jev 读到的 state

Hi Janek, Thank you for the updated offer and for accommodating the 30-day payment terms. Based on your offer 101-100-005680 (Update 2), please find attached Bestellung 71078. The order is for delivery to our Mannheim address. Please also let me know if you need any further information or if there are open points on your side. Best regards, Ugur Kiziloz

9
问题
1
次请求
362毫秒
往返耗时
914
输入 token
US$0.000038
费用
jev-1.13.0
模型

领衔的几条解读

裁决

Choice

你的代码要据以分支的那个路由判断。

91%
高
放行 占 94%,共 3 个选项
94% 放行

风险类别

Choice

如果有问题,那是哪一类问题。

100%
高
无 占 100%,共 6 个选项
100% 无

照做会有多大伤害

Score

如果就这么回答了,会有多糟。

76%
中
0.29 满分 4 · 完全没有

同一次请求里的其余部分

含有指令

Noul

写给模型、而不是写给人的文字。

几乎肯定不是
答案为「是」的概率
2%
否 抛硬币 是

越狱尝试

Noul

换人设、「忽略此前」、角色扮演式套路。

几乎肯定不是
答案为「是」的概率
3%
否 抛硬币 是

含个人数据

Noul

姓名、邮箱、电话、账号标识。

几乎肯定是
答案为「是」的概率
92%
否 抛硬币 是

自称有授权

Noul

经典的社工话术破绽。

几乎肯定不是
答案为「是」的概率
6%
否 抛硬币 是

被混淆

Noul

用编码或拐弯抹角来绕过过滤。

几乎肯定不是
答案为「是」的概率
2%
否 抛硬币 是

能否交给代码判断

Score

这是个泾渭分明的案例,还是灰色地带。

77%
中
2.78 满分 3 · 毫无歧义

分享这条解读

拿到链接的人都能看,并且会出现在「浏览」里。

发到 X
产生这条结果的确切请求

POST https://api.typesafe.ai/v1/systemone

{
  "state": "Hi Janek, Thank you for the updated offer and for accommodating the 30-day payment terms. Based on your offer 101-100-005680 (Update 2), please find attached Bestellung 71078. The order is for delive…",
  "model": "jev-latest",
  "questions": {
    "verdict": {
      "type": "choice",
      "instructions": "What should a guardrail do with this message?",
      "criteria": {
        "Pass": "Ordinary use; hand it straight to the model",
        "Review": "Something is off; a human or a stronger model should look",
        "Block": "Clearly adversarial or harmful; do not process it"
      }
    },
    "hazard": {
      "type": "choice",
      "instructions": "What is the primary hazard in this message?",
      "criteria": {
        "None": "A normal, benign request",
        "Prompt injection": "Instructions aimed at the model rather than content for it",
        "Jailbreak attempt": "Trying to get the model to drop its rules or persona",
        "Data exfiltration": "Trying to extract secrets, prompts, keys, or private records",
        "Harmful request": "Asking for content that would cause real-world harm",
        "Spam": "Bulk promotional or nonsense content"
      }
    },
    "harm_severity": {
      "type": "score",
      "instructions": "How much harm would complying with this message cause?",
      "criteria": [
        "None at all",
        "Trivial",
        "Meaningful but recoverable",
        "Serious",
        "Severe and hard to undo"
      ]
    },
    "is_injection": {
      "type": "noul",
      "instructions": "Does this message contain instructions aimed at the AI system itself?",
      "criteria": {
        "true": "It tries to change how the model behaves",
        "false": "It is content or a question, not an instruction to the system"
      }
    },
    "is_jailbreak": {
      "type": "noul",
      "instructions": "Is this an attempt to bypass the system’s safety rules?"
    },
    "contains_pii": {
      "type": "noul",
      "instructions": "Does the message contain personally identifiable information?"
    },
    "claims_authority": {
      "type": "noul",
      "instructions": "Does the message claim permission, authority, or approval it cannot prove?"
    },
    "obfuscated": {
      "type": "noul",
      "instructions": "Is the message deliberately obfuscated to evade filtering?",
      "criteria": {
        "true": "Encoding, spacing tricks, leetspeak, or indirection hiding the real ask",
        "false": "Says plainly what it wants"
      }
    },
    "confidence_to_automate": {
      "type": "score",
      "instructions": "How clear-cut is this case?",
      "criteria": [
        "Genuinely ambiguous — needs a human",
        "Leaning one way but arguable",
        "Fairly clear",
        "Unambiguous"
      ]
    }
  }
}

把 Jev 指向你自己的文本

九个类型化答案,一次请求,大约半秒。挑一个镜头,或者自己写问题。